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ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION BOUND: THE
INTERSECTION OF THE ETHICAL CODES
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
BRUCE A. GREEN*
Professional codes adopted by states and based on the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility govern lawyers' conduct. The ethical codes, however, fail to ad-
dress many ethical questions confronting lawyers.
In this Article, Professor Bruce Green highlights the ethical codes'
weaknesses, particularly as they relate to the conduct of criminal defense
attorneys. As he describes, the ethical codes require advocates to repre-
sent their clients "zealously, " but, at the same time, "within the bounds
of the law." When the codes do not proscribe conduct that would ad-
vance their clients' causes, conscientious advocates must consider
whether other laws, including the criminal laws, would forbid the pro-
posed conduct. When the relevant criminal laws themselves are ambigu-
ous, advocates face the further dilemma of whether to forego measures
beneficial to their clients or to engage in potentially criminal conduct.
To illustrate the difficulties the ethical codes create, Professor
Green focuses on a question that criminal defense attorneys sometimes
encounter: Is it permissible to advise an unrepresented witness to assert
the fifth amendment privilege instead ofproviding testimony harmful to
the attorney's client? Professor Green argues that the ethical codes
should explicitly forbid such conduct, which may violate obstruction-of-
justice statutes, to prevent well-intentioned attorneys from unwittingly
overstepping the bounds of the criminal law. He further argues that, in
the absence of clear guidance, attorneys should not interpret the duty of
"zealous representation" to compel conduct of doubtful legality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys have an ethical duty to represent their clients "zealously."' At
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., 1981, Columbia University
School of Law; A.B., 1978, Princeton University. I am grateful for the research assistance provided
by Dina DeGeorgio as a fellow of the Stein Institute on Law and Ethics, and for the helpful com-
ments of Marc M. Arkin, Edward M. Chikofsky, Denise L. Cote, Julie Katzman, Peter Margulies,
and Russell Pearce.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE]; id. DR 7-101; id. EC 7-1; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 comment
(1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The concept of "zealous representation" embraces the tradi-
tional view that the interests of the lawyer's client are generally paramount to the interest in the
administration of justice and almost invariably paramount to the interests of third parties. See, eg.,
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951); Thode, The Ethical Standard for the
Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REv. 575 (1961); see also Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception
of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529 (discussing the relationship between ethics and zealous
representation). For commentary that questions the traditional conception of a lawyer's role, see
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the same time, they must proceed "within the bounds of the law."'2 The law that
sets the bounds of proper conduct for attorneys-what aptly has been called
"the law governing lawyers"'--must be sought not only in the "ethical codes"
of the states in which a particular attorney practices and is licensed, 4 but in a
variety of other places as well. Lawyers are regulated by the rules of civil proce-
dure5 and by the law of tort,6 contract,7 agency s and partnership. 9 Moreover,
the criminal law establishes limits on the manner in which an advocate may
proceed.10
One might expect state ethical codes to define the concept of "zealous rep-
resentation" clearly, explicitly, and broadly enough to allow lawyers who com-
ply with the ethical rules easily to avoid committing crimes on behalf of their
clients. This expectation flows from the commonplace distinction between un-
ethical and criminal conduct. In everyday parlance, we regard a great deal of
behavior as "unethical," although not criminal; we think of the criminal law as
reaching only the most egregious wrongdoing, leaving untouched a variety of
wrongful conduct that may deserve public opprobrium but not punishment.I1
So, too, one might think that the lawyers' codes of ethics would define as "un-
ethical" a broad range of professional (or unprofessional) conduct encompassing
all the acts proscribed by the criminal law, as well as wrongdoing that falls short
Frankel, The Search for Truth. An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976);
Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL- L. REv. 957 (1978); Margu-
lies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and
the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L. REv. 213 (1990); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63 (1980); Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1083 (1988); Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis.
L. REv. 29; Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1 (1975);
Note, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judicial Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445
(1990).
2. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7; id. DR 7-102; id. EC 7-1; see MODEL RULES, supra
note 1, Rule 3.1 comment; In re Austern, 524 A.2d 680, 682-83 (D.C. 1987).
3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) THE LAW GOV-
ERNING LAWYERS (Tent. Draft No. 3, April 10, 1990).
4. In most states, the applicable code is based on either the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility or the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See generally Vairo, Rule 11. A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189
(1988) (discussing use of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to sanction lawyers for
abusive litigation behavior).
6. See, eg., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936-37 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980); Wilbourn v. Mostek Corp., 537 F. Supp. 302, 305-06 (D. Colo. 1982); Brown v.
E.W. Bliss Co., 72 F.R.D. 198, 200 (D. Md. 1976); Husted v. McCloud, 450 N.E.2d 491, 494-95
(Ind. 1983).
7. See, eg., Watson v. Cook, 427 So. 2d 1312, 1316 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Mack v. City of
Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 752-53 (Minn. 1983).
8. See, eg., Davis v. United Fruit Co., 402 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1085 (1969); Huene v. Carnes, 175 Cal. Rptr. 374, 377 (1981); Stricker v. Frauendienst, 669 P.2d
520, 521-22 (Wyo. 1983).
9. See, eg., Clients' Sec. Fund v. Grandeau, 72 N.Y.2d 62, 67-68, 526 N.E.2d 270, 273, 530
N.Y.S.2d 775, 778 (1988).
10. See G. HAZARD & S. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING 54-71 (1990);
Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 BUS. LAW. 129 (1984).
11. Cf. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (interpreting mail fraud statute
narrowly to avoid "involv[ing] the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials").
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of being criminal. If that were the case, then as long as a lawyer complied with
the prevailing professional rules of ethics, she could be confident of steering clear
of criminal conduct. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. In some situa-
tions, 12 the lawyers' codes leave lawyers at risk by failing to proscribe specifi-
cally conduct that may be criminal.
The first part of this Article focuses on one example of the ethical codes'
surrender to the criminal codes of the task of defining the proper scope of zeal-
ous representation. It begins with a hypothetical that raises a simple question
encountered often during the course of criminal investigations and occasionally
during trial: May a criminal defense attorney advise a potential government
witness to assert the privilege against self-incrimination rather than give testi-
mony that may inculpate the attorney's client? As this Article describes, the
ethical codes do not explicitly forbid this advice, even though discouraging a
witness from testifying in this manner may constitute the crime of obstruction of
justice.13
The second part of this Article examines the difficulties advocates face
when the ethical codes allow the criminal law to set the bounds of zealous repre-
sentation, particularly when, as in the example given, the lines the criminal law
draws are themselves uncertain. In a variety of situations, an advocate must
decide whether to engage in potentially criminal conduct that would further his
client's interests. The ethical codes give no guidance as to whether the duty of
"zealous representation" requires an attorney to engage in conduct approaching
the line of criminality, whether an attorney must refrain from such conduct, or
whether an attorney has discretion to choose his course of conduct.
This Article concludes that, as a general matter, the ethical codes inappro-
priately rely on ambiguous criminal laws to set the bounds of zealous advocacy.
The ethical codes should clearly and explicitly proscribe most professional con-
12. In many cases, professional conduct that violates the criminal code also would, indepen-
dently of the criminal law, violate the attorneys' codes. See, e.g., United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d
606, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1114 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United
States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359, 1361-63 (11th Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States
v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 943 (1983); United States v.
Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v.
Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Reicin,
497 F.2d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
13. For an interesting and insightful look at other issues lying at the crossroads of the ethical
codes and the criminal law of obstructing justice, see Uviller, Presumed Guilty: The Court of Appeals
Versus Scott Turow, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1879 (1988). Professor Uviller explores the unfair possibil-
ity that an ambiguous federal obstruction-of-justice statute might be interpreted in light of the pro-
scriptions of the ethical codes:
The enforcement of the professional proscriptions by criminal sanctions must at least
give us pause. Or, to put it the other way, filling in the spaces in a loosely worded criminal
statute by incorporating the tenets of a code of professional ethics raises interesting ques-
tions concerning the delegation of legislative authority to professional associations.
Id. at 1898; see also Podgor, Criminal Misconduct: Ethical Rule Usage Leads to Regulation of the
Legal Profession, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 1323, 1336-39 (1988) (discussing obstruction-of-justice prose-
cutions of lawyers in which ethical rules have been admitted in evidence or included in a jury in-
struction). By contrast, the present Article deals with a reverse situation: the use of the criminal law
to fill the spaces of the codes of professional ethics.
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duct that may be criminal. Moreover, the ethical codes should specify that, in
situations in which potentially criminal conduct is not explicitly deemed unethi-
cal, an advocate has discretion to refrain from the conduct, even if engaging in it
would advance his client's cause.
II. ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION AND OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
A. A Not-So-Hypothetical Question
Suppose you are a criminal defense attorney. Your client, Scrooge, owns a
real estate development company. He has just received a subpoena to testify
before a federal grand jury that is investigating improper payoffs that Scrooge's
company may have made to federal housing authorities. You have agreed to do
whatever the law permits to forestall his indictment.
Your principal task at this stage "is to prevent the government from ob-
taining evidence that could be inculpatory of [your] client and used by the inves-
tigator or prosecutor to justify issuance of a formal criminal charge."' 14 Toward
this end, you caution Scrooge against discussing the case with anyone but you,
because the government may later learn of statements he makes, even to trusted
friends, and use them to his detriment.15 You also advise Scrooge to assert his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, rather than answer questions
when he is called before the grand jury.
The risk remains, however, that other individuals, including Scrooge's em-
ployees, will provide the grand jury with information that incriminates him.
Scrooge tells you that the company's accountant, Cratchit, is aware of poten-
tially damaging information. You would, therefore, want to do whatever you
lawfully could do to limit Cratchit's disclosures to the government or to ensure,
at the very least, that Cratchit places Scrooge's conduct in a light favorable to
your client.
As a defense attorney, you have a variety of measures available to influence
third parties' disclosures to the government. 16 For example, you might en-
courage your client to cultivate Cratchit's loyalty. 17 Or you might suggest that
Scrooge try to influence Cratchit to keep quiet.' 8 You might also meet with
Cratchit yourself to find out what he remembers and, ideally, to "flush out inter-
pretations of facts that are favorable to the defense position."' 19
You decide, for starters, to meet with Cratchit yourself. At a meeting your
/
14. K. MANN, DEFENDING WHrrE-COLLAR CRIME 6 (1985). The white-collar defense attor-
ney's other main task is to gather information about the investigation. See generally id. at 37-100
(describing means by which white-collar defense attorneys gather information from their clients,
from individuals subject to their clients' control, and from adverse parties).
15. Id. at 124-56.
16. Id. at 157-80.
17. Id. at 158-60.
18. Id. at 159. Professor Mann observes: "In general, how a client achieves this is left up to
him-whether he offers bonuses, threatens to fire an employee, or-simply refrains from alienating
someone who could do damage." Id.
19. Id. at 162.
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client arranges, 20 you solicit Cratchit's version of the events. As Cratchit talks,
it becomes clear that his information may incriminate himself as well as Scrooge.
It obviously would further your client's interests for Cratchit to assert the fifth
amendment privilege in the event the grand jury subpoenas him, and you believe
that asserting the privilege would serve Cratchit's interests as well. Therefore,
although Cratchit is not your client, you would like to give him essentially the
same advice that you gave your own client, that is, to assert the fifth amendment
privilege instead of cooperating with the government's investigation. In the al-
ternative, at the very least, you would like to remind Cratchit that he has a right
to refuse to cooperate. 2 1 Is it proper for you to take steps such as these to dis-
courage a third party from testifying before the grand jury? This question,
which is of practical as well as theoretical significance,2 2 defies a simple answer.
B. The Ethical Standards
Because it is widely assumed that the ethical rules promulgated by the or-
ganized bar place the broadest restrictions on attorneys' conduct, an attorney
logically would look first to those rules to determine whether it is proper to
advise a witness to assert the fifth amendment privilege. Moreover, because this
question arises with some frequency for criminal defense attorneys, one might
reasonably expect that the ethical rules would answer it clearly and explicitly.
Examination, however, reveals that the ethical rules provide no clear guidance
on this question.
Before the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Model Code) in 1969, the prevailing view was that a
criminal defense lawyer was allowed to apprise an unrepresented witness of the
availability of the fifth amendment privilege. An informal opinion issued by an
advisory committee of the ABA in 1962 concluded that warning a prosecution
20. Meetings between a white-collar defense lawyer and his client's associates or employees
typically are set up by the client. Id. at 161.
21. Professor Kenneth Mann provides the following example of a speech in which one defense
attorney obliquely advised his client's employee to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination:
Now I'm not telling you to take the Fifth or anything like that, but just remember that
the rights that the Supreme Court in the sixties made for blacks are for you also, those
rights that the Supreme Court is erasing one by one now. The worst thing in the world
that happens to middle-class people is that, where they had no problems, later they find
themselves with more than they could handle because they talk too much.
Id. at 164.
As one reviewer observed, this speech was one of the most disturbing examples cited by Mann
of the veiled communications made by lawyers to clients or third parties. Carberry, Book Review,
16 SETON HALL L. REV. 290, 296-97 & n.31 (1986). For additional reviews of this excellent contri-
bution to our understanding of what defense attorneys do in white-collar cases, see Glassberg, DE-
FENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A Game Without Rules (Book Note), 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 831
(1985); Hazard, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Book Review), 5 YALE L.J. 1523 (1986); Kostelan-
etz, Anatomy of a Legal Subspecialty: Looking at White Collar Crime (Book Review), 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1852 (1985); Schneyer, Getting from "Is" to "Ought" in Legal Ethics: Aann's DEFENDING
WHITE COLLAR CRIME, 1986 A.B.F. RES. J. 903 (1986); Wade, Book Review, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 193
(1986).
22. See K. MANN, supra note 14, at 16-18; Tigar, Crime Talk Rights Talk, and Double Talk-
Thoughts on Reading ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, 65 TEX. L. REV. 101, 111 (1986)
(criminal convictions for advising witnesses validly to assert the fifth amendment privilege "are of
intense theoretical and practical interest").
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witness of his right against self-incrimination is permissible even "[i]f the defense
attorney's primary motivation in so advising the prosecution witness is the desire
to encourage or to persuade the prosecution witness not to testify against the
accused."'23 The advisory opinion did not address the question whether an at-
torney could go one step further and advise the unrepresented witness that he
should assert his privilege.
The Model Code provision addressing communications between a lawyer
and an unrepresented individual casts doubt on the earlier view that a defense
attorney may properly advise a potential government witness about the availa-
bility of the fifth amendment privilege. That provision, Disciplinary Rule (DR)
7-104(A)(2), provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not
... [g]ive advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other
than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or
have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of
his client. 24
This rule is directed primarily against the practice of giving advice to an unrep-
resented adversary or potential adversary. 25 However, the reference to "per-
son," rather than to "party," suggests that the rule sweeps more broadly to
forbid giving advice to anyone, including a potential witness, if his interests po-
tentially conflict with those of the lawyer's client.26
In State v. Fosse,27 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals liberally interpreted DR
7-104(A)(2) to bar a defense attorney from advising prosecution witnesses of the
availability of the fifth amendment privilege. Prior to trial, defense counsel in
that case asked the court to advise three prosecution witnesses of both their
privilege against self-incrimination and their right to counsel.28 Based on the
prosecutor's representation that he had no intention of bringing charges against
the witnesses, the trial court denied the motion and instructed defense counsel
23. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 575 (1962); see also ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 498 (1962) (concluding that an attorney's duty to provide his
client a zealous defense is not "nullified" by any restrictions on advising a witness that his answers
may incriminate him). The 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics also suggested that giving this advice
is proper. Canon 9 provided: "It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid every-
thing that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to
advise him as to the law." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 9 (Rev. ed. 1947). The
implication was that it is proper to advise a nonparty witness as to the law. At the same time,
however, lawyers understood that limits existed on what a lawyer might do to dissuade a witness
from giving adverse testimony. See, eg., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 86 (1953) ("A lawyer for the
defense may not try to close the mouths of witnesses in a murder case, or try to close those of
disinterested persons who know the facts, or prevent counsel for the other side from learning such
facts from them." (footnotes omitted)).
24. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-104(A)(2).
25. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1140 (1970)
[hereinafter ABA Comm. on Ethics] (DR 7-104(A)(2) "simply carries forward the meaning and
intent" of Canon 9 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.).
26. See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 342 (1979) (reference in DR 7-
104(A)(2) to "a person," rather than "a party," renders obsolete earlier informal opinions that per-
mitted a defense lawyer to advise a government witness about the availability of the fifth amendment
privilege).
27. 144 Wis. 2d 700, 424 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. App. 1988).
28. Id. at 702, 424 N.W.2d at 726-27.
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not to advise the witnesses himself.29 Despite the court's ruling, the defense
attorney subsequently apprised one witness of his fifth amendment privilege and
his right to counsel and had his intern give similar advice to a second witness. 30
When defense counsel's conduct was called to the trial court's attention after a
jury was selected, the trial court declared a mistrial based on a finding that the
lawyer had engaged in misconduct.3 1
On appeal, the Wisconsin appellate court agreed that defense counsel in
Fosse had acted unethically. 32 It reasoned that DR 7-104(A)(2) 33 was designed
"to avoid situations where an unrepresented person may follow advice not in
that person's best interest because such advice was given by an attorney whose
loyalty lies not with the person to whom the advice is given, but to another."'34
In this case, the court found that the interests of the unrepresented witnesses for
the prosecution conflicted with the defendant's interests, and the statements of
defense counsel and his intern, who were not disinterested, constituted "legal
advice that may have misled the witnesses or caused them to act in a manner not
in their own best interests."'35
In contrast, a number of arguments support reading DR 7-104(A)(2) con-
sistently with the 1962 ABA advisory opinion that permitted defense lawyers to
apprise witnesses of their fifth amendment privilege. If the drafters of the Model
Code had intended to reject the view taken by another ABA committee less than
a decade earlier, they would have done so explicitly. That they did not suggests
that the drafters meant to preserve the prevailing view, of which they undoubt-
edly were aware.3 6
Moreover, it is far from apparent that simply and accurately apprising
Cratchit of the availability of the fifth amendment privilege constitutes the giv-
ing of "advice" as proscribed by the disciplinary rule.37 This conduct instead
might be characterized as the giving of "information" that may be of some rele-
vance to Cratchit. Going further and suggesting that it would be in Cratchit's
best interest to assert the privilege would be giving legal advice;38 merely re-
29. Id. at 702, 424 N.W.2d at 727.
30. Id. at 702-03, 424 N.W.2d at 727.
31. Id. at 704, 424 N.W.2d at 727.
32. Id. at 705, 424 N.W.2d at 728.
33. The rule on which the court relied, Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20.38(2), was virtually
identical to DR 7-104(A)(2). Id. at 705, 424 N.W.2d at 728.
34. Id. at 706, 424 N.W.2d at 728.
35. Id. at 707, 424 N.W.2d at 729.
36. Whether the "intent" of the ABA drafters is ultimately what a court should focus on when
interpreting ambiguous ethical rules is another question, and one on which I have previously ex-
pressed some doubt. See Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical
Rules, 55 BROOKLYN L. REv. 485, 530-52 (1989).
37. Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 1269 (1973) (not improper to submit form
to unrepresented adversary calling for waiver of summons and entry of appearance) with ABA
Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 1255 (1972) (submitting responsive pleadings to unrepresented ad-
versary constitutes offering advice).
38. Cf. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 676 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976) (DR 7-104(A)(2) has
been read to prohibit giving advice as to the law.). Similarly, apprising Cratchit that his prospective
testimony would inculpate him, so that he would be entitled to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination, would be giving advice, albeit advice that in many instances would be
incontrovertible.
1991]
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minding him of what is entirely incontrovertible and of what he almost undoubt-
edly knows already-that he has a right to refuse to give self-incriminatory
testimony-may not be.
Even if apprising Cratchit of the fifth amendment privilege would be "giv-
ing advice," DR 7-104(A)(2) does not forbid you to do so unless there is at least
a reasonable possibility that Cratchit's interests conflict with Scrooge's interests.
Whether a possible adversity of interests exists varies from case to case. As
defense counsel, you might reasonably conclude that at this stage Scrooge and
Cratchit share a common interest in preventing the government from learning
about their involvement in the bribery scheme under investigation. By keeping
the government in the dark, they may both avoid having to face criminal
charges. 39
An Illinois appellate court concluded in People v. Wolf 40 that DR 7-
104(A)(2) 41 does not forbid a defense lawyer from apprising a potential govern-
ment witness that he may assert the fifth amendment privilege. In that case, the
trial court held an attorney, Henry J. Romanski, in contempt of court for advis-
ing a prosecution witness-a codefendant who had already pleaded guilty-that
his testimony could lead to additional criminal charges and that he had a fifth
amendment right not to testify.42 On appeal from his contempt conviction, the
39. A similar question often arises when a single defense attorney is retained to represent multi-
ple grand jury witnesses. See generally Moore, Disqualification of an Attorney Representing Multiple
Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1980)(considering the ethical concerns of multiple representation and discussing possible standards for
disqualification); Pedowitz & Price, Conflicts of Interest Arising From Multiple Representation in a
Grand Jury Investigation, 365 PLI Lrr. & ADMIN. PRAC. SER. 137 (1988) (noting that there are
many factors an attorney must weigh in this context); Tague, Multiple Representation of Targets and
Witnesses during a Grand Jury Investigation, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 301, 306-07 (1980) (discussing
the "root nature" of the conflict). From time to time, prosecutors move to disqualify the witnesses'
attorney on the theory that the witnesses' interests conflict, so that the representation of more than
one witness in the grand jury would violate the prevailing ethical standards. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 859 F.2d 1021, 1022 (1st Cir. 1988); In re Investigation Before the February 1977,
Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th
Cir. 1976); In re Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d 183, 190, 465 N.E.2d 1, 3-4, 476 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496-97 (1984);
Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 517-18, 341 A.2d 896, 899 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
In such cases, courts generally find that the witnesses' interests are at least potentially in conflict.
See, eg., Gopman, 531 F.2d at 266; In re Investigative Grand Jury Proceedings on April 10, 1979
and Continuing, 480 F. Supp. 162, 171 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Pirillo, 462 Pa. at 530-31, 341 A.2d at 905-
06. This is true even when, as often occurs, the court goes on to deny the prosecution's motion in
light of the witnesses' overriding interest in counsel of choice. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183,
1191 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Empaneled Jan. 21, 1975 (National Maritime), 536 F.2d 1009,
1012-13 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand Jury (Washington Post),
531 F.2d 600, 606-08 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d at 197, 465 N.E.2d at 7-8, 476 N.Y.S.2d
at 501. Even if the representation of multiple grand jury witnesses gives rise to a potential conflict of
interest, however, it does not necessarily follow that, at a time before Cratchit is even contacted by
federal investigators, his interest can be said to be potentially adverse to Scrooge's interests. See
People v. Wolf, 162 Ill. App. 3d 57, 60, 514 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (1987), leave to appeal denied, 118 Il1.
2d 551 (1988); see generally Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees Motions to
Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1201, 1217-18 & nn. 82-84 (1989) (in
conflict-of-interest cases, courts take too broad a view of adversity between the defendant and a
government witness).
40. 162 Ill. App. 3d 57, 514 N.E.2d 1218 (1987), leave to appeal denied, 118 I1. 2d 551 (1988).
41. The court actually was interpreting the comparable Illinois rule that is identical to the
Model Code. Id. at 60, 514 N.E.2d at 1219.
42. Id. at 58-59, 514 N.E.2d at 1219.
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attorney conceded that his motive in giving this advice was to serve his client's
interests, not the interests of the witness. Romanski argued, however, that the
advice nevertheless was accurate and that he was entitled to give it.43 The ap-
pellate court agreed, finding, among other things, that DR 7-104(A)(2) did not
forbid giving this advice because the witness's interests did not conflict with the
interests of Romanski's client.44
Although other provisions of the Model Code govern an attorney's commu-
nications with potential witnesses, none clearly forbids advising Cratchit to keep
quiet. For example, a lawyer may neither advise a witness to leave the jurisdic-
tion to avoid giving testimony45 nor pay a witness for giving helpful testimony.4 6
Provisions such as these, however, do not speak to the question whether a law-
yer may properly apprise a witness of his fifth amendment privilege.
In 1983, when it adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules), the ABA failed to clarify whether a lawyer may properly advise a wit-
ness to assert the constitutional privilege. Under the Model Rules' counterpart
to DR 7-104(A)(2), you could at least apprise Cratchit of the availability of the
fifth amendment privilege. Model Rule (MR) 3.4(f) provides:
A lawyer shall not... request a person other than a client to refrain
from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client;
and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will
not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.4 7
The first part of the exception applies because Cratchit is am employee of
Scrooge. Moreover, the second part of the exception applies because asserting
the fifth amendment privilege probably would be in Cratchit's best interests; in
any event, at this stage, asserting the privilege would not be adverse to Cratchit's
interests. Accordingly, you would not appear to be violating this rule if you
were to advise Cratchit directly and emphatically to refuse to cooperate with
federal agents and to assert his privilege as a witness before the grand jury.
Although advising witnesses of the fifth amendment privilege could violate
other provisions of the Code and the Model Rules, their terms are so general
that they provide no clear guidance to lawyers. For example, both DR 1-
102(A)(5) of the Model Code and Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules forbid an
attorney from "[e]ngag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice."'48 This is a "catch-all" or "residual" provision to which courts and
43. Id. at 60, 514 N.E.2d at 1219.
44. Id. at 60-61, 514 N.E.2d at 1219-20.
45. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-109(B).
46. Id. DR 7-109(C).
47. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(f). Communications with unrepresented individuals
also are addressed by Rule 4.3 of the Model Rules, which provides, in part: "In dealing on behalf of
a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the
lawyer is disinterested." Although the comment accompanying Rule 4.3 states that "[during the
course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not give advice to an unrepresented
person other than the advice to secure counsel," the rule itself does not forbid giving advice to an
unrepresented witness as long as the lawyer ensures that the witness understands the lawyer's role in
the matter.
48. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(5); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 8.4(d).
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disciplinary bodies occasionally resort when they want to punish an advocate's
conduct that is not specifically proscribed by the ethical rules. Although the
term "prejudicial to the administration of justice" is open ended,49 courts have
not considered it so vague as to violate the due process clause. 50
One court has relied on this open-ended rule to punish a lawyer who coun-
seled potential witnesses to remain silent. In the course of representing a target
of a federal grand jury investigation into municipal corruption, the attorney in
In re Blatt 51 met with potential grand jury witnesses and suggested to them that,
if they were questioned by federal authorities, they should be uncooperative and
say as little as possible-or, in the recollection of one of those witnesses, "that
we should keep our mouths shut." 52 The New Jersey Supreme Court found that
this conduct could "only be understood as an attempt to deny evidence to law
enforcement officials," constituting "'conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice,' in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5)." 53
It is unclear whether the court would have reached the same conclusion
had the lawyer merely advised the witnesses that they had a fifth amendment
right to remain silent. Simply advising a witness of his constitutional right,
without expressing a view as to whether or not he ought to assert that right,
seems materially different from advising a witness to "keep [his] mouth shut."
Though the ends are the same, the means are different. Even if characterized as
"legal advice," informing a witness of her fifth amendment right merely supplies
her with correct information to which she is entitled. As the Illinois court found
in People v. Wolf,54 advising a witness about the fifth amendment privilege does
not "obstruct the trial court in its administration of justice."'5 5 The court rea-
soned that the defense lawyer in that case "was entitled to advise [the prosecu-
tion witness] of his fifth amendment privilege not to incriminate himself.
Certainly it cannot be said that [the prosecution witness] was not entitled to
know about this constitutional right." 56
When an attorney not only advises a prosecution witness that he has a fifth
amendment right, but also urges the witness to assert that right, his conduct is
more difficult to defend. One might argue that this conduct is no better than the
49. See, eg., Uviller, supra note 13, at 1887 (DR 1-102(A)(5) "is broad to the point of
formlessness.").
50. See, eg., Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982
(1988). Some courts have taken the questionable view that lawyers should know what the term
encompasses because lawyers are presumed to be familiar with "the lore of the profession." See,
eg., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1565 (1 1th Cir. 1990);
Howell, 843 F.2d at 208; see also In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 n.7 (1st Cir. 1973) ("We refer to
the Code only as an illustration of the lore of the profession, which we assume is familiar or should
be to all attorneys.").
51. 65 N.J. 539, 324 A.2d 15 (1974).
52. Id. at 542, 324 A.2d at 17.
53. Id. at 543, 324 A.2d at 18. For that and a variety of other misconduct, the state court
ordered the attorney suspended from the practice of law. Id. at 548, 324 A.2d at 20.
54. 162 11. App. 3d 57, 514 N.E.2d 1218 (1987), leave to appeal denied, 118 II. 2d 551 (1988);
see supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
55. 162 Ill. App. 3d at 61, 514 N.E.2d at 1221.
56. Id. at 61, 514 N.E.2d at 1220.
[Vol. 69
ETHICAL REPRESENTATION
conduct condemned in In re Blatt,57 because the advice to "assert the fifth
amendment privilege" is simply a high-flown version of the advice to "keep your
mouth shut." In either case, the intended effect of the lawyer's advice is to con-
vince the witness to withhold evidence from the prosecution. A defense attorney
might argue that, while the admonition to "keep your mouth shut" seems im-
bued with coercion, the lawyerly advice to "assert the privilege" is disinterested
and unthreatening. Viewed in the context of an employer's attorney counseling
an employee, however, even the advice to assert the fifth amendment privilege
seems coercive; a reasonably astute employee would perceive that, by rejecting
the lawyer's advice, he would be putting his job in jeopardy.
There is nevertheless some judicial support for the view that it is ethical to
advise a witness to assert the constitutional privilege. In McNeal v. Hollowell,58
a defense lawyer contacted a witness and the witness's lawyer shortly before the
witness was to testify for the government. The defendant's lawyer successfully
persuaded the witness to assert the fifth amendment privilege at trial. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the lawyer had acted properly. In
the court's view, the lawyer's conduct
was no more than the legitimate action of a defense counsel who was
contacting an important witness... and his counsel to discuss a matter
of mutual importance to them. While we need not go so far as to say
that it was [defense counsel's] duty to do this, we have no doubt that
he was entitled to do it .... 59
The appellate court in McNeal might have taken a less charitable view if the
lawyer had contacted an unrepresented witness, rather than a witness and his
lawyer.6° Yet the court's reasoning might apply even when an unrepresented
witness is contacted directly. In the court's view, the witness's decision whether
to testify was a matter of mutual importance that could legitimately be broached
and discussed by the defendant's lawyer. If the witness had been unrepresented,
there would have been no practical way for the defendant's lawyer to initiate a
57. 65 N.J. 539, 324 A.2d 15 (1974); see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
58. 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
59. Id. at 1152. Because of the witness's refusal to testify, the prosecutor sought an order of
nolleprosequi, which was granted by the trial judge in the middle of defendant McNeal's trial. The
witness himself was subsequently tried and acquitted, which had the effect of immunizing him from
further prosecution, then McNeal was reindicted and retried. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that, because defense counsel had not improperly procured the witness's refusal to testify at
the first trial, the order dismissing the charges during that trial was improper, and a retrial was
barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 1151-52.
60. In a case such as McNeal, the presence of the witness's own attorney diminishes the coer-
cive effect of a lawyer's advice about the fifth amendment privilege and enables the witness to receive
an evaluation of that advice by an attorney who has his own interests at heart. See Green, Limits on
a Prosecutor's Communications With Prospective Defense Witnesses, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 139, 163
(1983). In addition, this makes the situation more like one in which the witness is receiving the
advice from his own lawyer. Courts generally have not criticized arrangements between defense
lawyers that are in the interests of their respective clients and, in fact, have recognized a "joint
defense privilege" that encourages such arrangements by protecting the confidentiality of statements
made by counsel or the codefendants in preparation of a joint defense. For discussions of the joint
defense privilege, see Capra, Attorney-Client Privilege When Parties Share Interests, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
9, 1990, at 3, col. 1; Capra, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Common Representations, 20 TRIAL
LAW. Q. 20 (1989).
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discussion on this issue other than by communicating directly with the witness.
To say that a defense lawyer cannot raise matters of mutual importance with a
witness except when the witness had the foresight and resources to retain an
attorney of his own seems unfair to both the defendant and the witness.
In interpreting vague or ambiguous provisions of the ethical rules, such as
those proscribing "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, '6 1 a law-
yer might also look for guidance to other expressions by the organized bar of
what it considers to be proper attorney conduct. In particular, the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, first adopted in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
although not enforceable in themselves, would be a logical place to seek gui-
dance.6 2 These Standards, however, offer little help.
For example, the Standards Relating to the Defense Function, approved by
the ABA Board of Delegates in 1971, address a defense lawyer's dealings with
potential witnesses. Standard 4.3(c) provides: "A lawyer should not obstruct
communication between prospective witnesses and the prosecutor. It is unpro-
fessional conduct to advise a person, other than a client, to refuse to give infor-
mation to the prosecutor .... *63 Although, standing alone, this provision
might be read to apply to advice about a witness's fifth amendment privilege, the
commentary to Standard 4.3 suggests that it was not meant to do so. The com-
mentary notes, presumably with approval, that the ABA Ethics Committee de-
cided in 1962 that discouraging a witness from testifying by warning him that
his testimony might incriminate him is properA4 Because of the seeming contra-
diction between the language of Standard 4.3 and the commentary that accom-
panies it, the ABA Standards provide no greater guidance than the ethical
provisions that they are designed to supplement.
In sum, the ethical codes fail to speak clearly to the question whether a
defense attorney may advise a witness to assert the fifth amendment privilege.
Reasonable arguments might be made that such advice violates neither the spe-
cific rules governing communications with unrepresented individuals nor the
general provisions proscribing "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
ofjustice." The few judicial opinions that relate to this question take conflicting
approaches, and those opinions that have condemned advice about the fifth
amendment privilege may be interpreted narrowly. Therefore, as Scrooge's
counsel, you could fairly conclude that, unless some law outside the Code for-
bids advising Cratchit to "take the fifth," you can properly do so to ensure that
Scrooge receives zealous representation.
61. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(5); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule
8.4(d); supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
62. See, eg., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice reflect "[p]revailing norms of practice").
63. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 229 (1971).
64. Id. at 230. The Standards were amended, but neither this standard nor the commentary
were changed materially. See 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE chs. 3,4 (2d ed, 1982).
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C. Obstruction of Justice
Although the ethical rules do not plainly forbid advising your client's em-
ployee about the fifth amendment privilege, you would have to consider whether
that advice is forbidden by some other law. The particular law that casts doubt
on the propriety of this advice is the criminal law dealing with obstruction of
justice. Under the federal obstruction-of-justice statutes, it is clearly a crime for
you or anyone else to use force, threats, promises, or other undue influence to
try to coerce Cratchit, a potential federal grand jury witness, to assert the fifth
amendment privilege. 65 But it is far from certain whether it would be improper
for you to advise Cratchit truthfully that he has a constitutional right not to
cooperate with the federal investigation, or, even to go further, and suggest that,
in your opinion, it is in his interest to exercise that right.6 6 When it comes to
this question, the bounds of zealous advocacy set by the criminal law appear no
clearer than those set by the ethical codes themselves.
The earliest judicial decisions took the view that it is not a crime for a
lawyer to advise a witness to assert the fifth amendment privilege. A federal
district court in 1928 issued the first opinion to address this question. In United
States v. Herron,67 the court held the federal obstruction statute would not apply
to a lawyer who persuaded a witness to assert a valid claim of privilege. The
court reasoned that an attorney could not properly be convicted of obstructing
justice simply for "advising a witness to do that which was lawful and would in
fact have protected the witness from disclosing self-incriminating matter."'68
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit's 1973 decision in McNeal v. Hollowell6 9 found that
it is not a federal crime for a defense lawyer to persuade a witness to assert the
fifth amendment privilege, at least as long as that witness is represented by his
own attorney. The lawfulness of this practice is also supported by United States
v. Metcalf,70 in which the Ninth Circuit held that the obstruction statute does
not apply when one merely advises a witness to remain silent, but instead only
applies where the attempt to silence a witness is made through some type of
intimidation.7 1
Other decisions raise doubts, however, about the legality of this practice.
For example, several courts have upheld criminal convictions of nonlawyers
who, with "corrupt" motives, advised others to "take the fifth."'72 While not
65. See, eg., United States v. Branch, 850 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.denied, 488 U.S.
1018 (1989); United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d 823, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1985).
66. If this advice were criminal, it could also be the basis of professional discipline under any of
a number of provisions of the Code that forbid lawyers from engaging in illegal conduct. See, eg.,
MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(3), (5) & (6); id. DR 7-102(A)(8).
67. 28 F.2d 122 (N.D. Cal. 1928).
68. Id. at 123.
69. 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 58-60.
70. 435 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1970).
71. Id. at 756-57. The court observed that "the manner in which the statute may be violated
would ordinarily seem to be limited to intimidating actions." Id. at 757.
72. See United States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 964, 968 (4th Cir. 1979) (affirming defendant's convic-
tion for obstruction of justice where defendant urged witnesses not to testify and supplied them with
sedatives to impede their testimony and conceal his crime); Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 440
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expressly addressing the question whether the obstruction statute extends to
lawyers in a similar situation,73 the courts' opinions do not suggest any obvious
distinction between nonlawyers and lawyers. These decisions reflect the view
that attempts to influence a witness, although otherwise lawful, are proscribed
by the obstruction statute when the "defendant had the requisite corrupt intent
to improperly influence the investigation." 74 A nonlawyer who advises a wit-
ness to assert the fifth amendment privilege has the requisite "corrupt intent"
when his motive is not to protect the witness, but to further his own interest in
concealing his crime.75 These opinions leave open the possibility that when a
criminal defense lawyer's advice to a potential government witness is designed to
further a client's penal interests rather than the witness's interests, the lawyer
will similarly be deemed to have acted in violation of the obstruction statute.
Far more important, and more worrisome, is the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit's 1975 decision in United States v. Fayer.76 Fayer involved an
attorney who served as a director of a corporation and who also represented
both the corporation and two of its principals. His clients became targets of an
investigation of corruption at the Federal Housing Authority (FHA).77 In the
course of the representation, Fayer and his clients met with Goodwin, an FHA
appraiser who allegedly had received a bribe from Fayer's clients.78 During
their conversation, Fayer disparaged Goodwin's attorney and tried to convince
Goodwin not to testify before the grand jury.79 Unknown to Fayer, Goodwin
was already cooperating with the investigation and was wearing a tape
recorder.8 0
At the time of Fayer's conversation with Goodwin, the federal obstruction-
of-justice statute contained general, open-ended language. Witness tampering
(9th Cir.) (affirming defendant's obstruction of justice conviction where defendant insisted, with
corrupt motive, that witness invoke fifth amendment), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
73. See, eg., Cole, 329 F.2d at 440 (expressly leaving this question open).
74. United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing cases).
75. Baker, 611 F.2d at 966-68.
76. 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975); see also United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.)(affirming conviction for conspiracy to obstruct grand jury investigation where defendant attorney,
seeking to assist the targets of a grand jury investigation, dissuaded a client who was granted immu-
nity from testifying before the grand jury or cooperating with the investigation, obtained unauthor-
ized information about grand jury investigation by abusing his position as attorney of record for a
witness), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987). But see McNeal v. Holloway, 481 F.2d 1145, 1152 (5th
Cir. 1973) (defense counsel did not violate the obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, where
he prevailed upon a witness and the witness's lawyer, but did not use bribery, coercion, force, or
threats to induce the witness to claim the privilege), cerL denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
77. Fayer, 523 F.2d at 662.
78. Id.
79. In a later opinion upholding Fayer's conviction for committing perjury at the trial before
Judge Weinstein, the Second Circuit characterized Fayer's interchange with Goodwin as follows:
A fair reading of the transcript of the recorded conversation establishes clearly that
both the Bernsteins and Fayer repeatedly urged Goodwin not to talk before the grand jury.
They also urged Goodwin to discharge his attorney, who had recommended that Goodwin
cooperate with the Government, and replace him with another attorney who would be paid
by the Bernsteins. Finally, the Berusteins, with Fayer's apparent approval, offered Good-
win a job in their Florida office if his refusal to cooperate cost him his F.H.A. job.
United States v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741, 743 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
80. Fayer, 523 F.2d at 662.
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was governed by 18 U.S.C. § 1503,81 which criminalized any endeavor "cor-
ruptly" to influence any witness or "corruptly" to impede "the due administra-
tion of justice."8 2 Based on his recorded statements to Goodwin, Fayer was
charged with endeavoring "corruptly" to influence a witness.8 3
Fayer waived his right to a jury and tried the case to Judge Weinstein in the
Eastern District of New York.8 4 His defense was that he had not acted with a
"corrupt" motive, but instead had been led by his clients to believe that Good-
win wanted his legal advice about whether or not to retain a new lawyer.85
Judge Weinstein acquitted Fayer, finding that there was a reasonable doubt as to
whether he had a corrupt motive. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed
the government's appeal.8 6 In so doing, however, the appellate court made clear
that the evidence amply would have supported a conviction. 7
In his opinion for the court of appeals in Fayer, Judge Oakes took the view
that the obstruction-of-justice statute provides no exemption for lawyers who
"corruptly" advise potential witnesses to assert the fifth amendment privilege.
The opinion explained that, as long as at least one of Fayer's motives was "cor-
rupt" when he advised the potential witness not to testify before the grand jury,
the defense attorney's conduct would have violated the obstruction-of-justice
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976). Section 1503 then provided, in pertinent part:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communica-
tion, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any court of the United
States ... or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communica-
tion, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the
due administration of justice, [shall be guilty of a crime].
Id.
82. Id. The current law relating to witness tampering is 18 U.S.C. § 1512, which makes it a
crime to "corruptly" attempt to persuade another person to withhold testimony from an official
proceeding. Section 1512(b) provides, in part:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly
persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward
another person, with intent to-
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceed-
ing; [or]
(2) cause or induce any person to-
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object,
from an official proceeding...
[shall be guilty of a crime].
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1988).
When this provision was added in 1982, § 1503 was amended to delete references to witness
tampering. Witness tampering has nevertheless continued to be prosecuted under the earlier provi-
sion. See, eg., United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 990 (1st Cir.) ("altogether clear that interfer-
ence with a [witness in a] grand jury investigation fits snugly within the contemplation of § 1503"),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987).
83. Fayer, 523 F.2d at 662. The charge was brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 as it existed prior
to the 1982 amendment. Id.
84. Id. at 661 & n.1.
85. Id. at 663.
86. Id. at 663-64. Fayer subsequently was tried and convicted of pejury in connection with his
testimony before Judge Weinstein. United States v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 831 (1978).
87. Fayer, 523 F.2d at 664.
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statute.8 8 "Corrupt" intent, as understood by both the district and appellate
courts, was an intent not to benefit the witness, but to protect the lawyer's own
clients from having their crimes discovered. 89 As interpreted in Fayer, lawyers
seeking to serve the penal interests of their clients are treated no more solici-
tously under the criminal statute than clients seeking to serve their own penal
interests. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expressed a simi-
lar view in United States v. Cintolo9 and concluded that lawyers ought to ad-
here to higher standards of conduct regardless of their subjective intent.
In 1982 Congress amended the federal obstruction statute to remove the
provision dealing with witness tampering. At the same time, Congress created a
new witness-tampering statute to deal with that problem. That statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1512, criminalizes any attempt to "corruptly persuade[] another per-
son" with intent to "cause or induce" that person to withhold testimony. While
it may be that section 1503, as amended, no longer applies to attempts to silence
witnesses,9 1 a lawyer's advice to a witness to "take the fifth" might still be ille-
88. Id. at 663-64. Thus, in the court's view, even a partially innocent motive on the lawyer's
part would not negate the element of "corrupt" intent. Id.
89. Id. at 663. The appellate court quoted the district judge's observation that "if the whole
thing were set up to protect the Bernsteins rather than Goodwin, I would have found [Fayer] guilty"
and that to convict Fayer, "[$t would have to be found that protection of [his clients] was 'corrupt,'
Le., that Fayer was acting with knowledge of crimes committed, as opposed to giving innocent coun-
sel." Id. at 664.
Commentators discussing the lawfulness of lawyers' communications with witnesses have not
acknowledged fully the possibility that advising a witness about the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion may be a crime when the lawyer's motive is to advance her client's penal interests. For example,
one treatise on the ethics of criminal defense practice advises:
It is not a crime for a lawyer to merely suggest to a person he should refuse to talk to
the government or invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. If, however, the advice
is with a corrupt intent (e.g., bribery) to cause the witness to remain silent, a crime would
have occurred.
J. HALL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER §,21.11, at 616 (1987) (foot-
notes omitted). The parenthetical reference to bribery suggests erroneously that, except when other-
wise illegal means are employed to procure a witness's silence, the lawyer's intent will not be deemed
to be "corrupt."
Similarly, a treatise on white-collar crime advises that counselling a witness to remain silent is
unlawful when the lawyer's intent is "merely to prevent the witness from disclosing information that
is incriminating to the lawyer," but it is lawful for a lawyer to give "honest, uncorrupt and disinter-
ested advice to assert the privilege." 3 K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 12.08, at
102-03 (1984) (citations omitted). This commentary fails to clarify that the lawyer's advice may be
deemed "corrupt" and "interested" not only when the lawyer's purpose is to protect herself from
incrimination, but also when her motive is to protect her client.
90. 818 F.2d 980 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987). The circuit court stated:
[W]e emphatically reject the notion that a law degree, like some sorcerer's amulet, can
ward offthe rigors of the criminal law. No spells of this sort are cast by the acceptance of a
defendant's retainer. We decline to chip some sort of special exception for lawyers into the
brickwork of § 1503. By our reckoning, attorneys cannot be relieved of obligations of law-
fulness imposed on the citizenry at large. Acceptable notions of evenhanded justice require
that statutes like § 1503 apply to all persons, without preferment or favor. As sworn of-
ficers of the court, lawyers should not seek to avail themselves of relaxed rules of conduct.
To the exact contrary, they should be held to the very highest standards in promoting the
cause of justice.
Id. at 996.
91. See United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Congress affirmatively
intended to remove witnesses entirely from the scope of § 1503."); see generally Note, Defining Wit-
ness Tampering Under 18 US.C Section 1512, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1417 (1986) (discussing witness-
tampering statute). But see United States v. Branch, 850 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[o]n the
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gal, albeit under section 1512. The Fayer court's view of "corrupt" intent un-
doubtedly would be relevant to the more recent statute.
One might reason, however, that as Scrooge's lawyer, your motive in advis-
ing Cratchit about the fifth amendment privilege would not be "corrupt." To
begin with, unlike Fayer, who was a director of the corporation under investiga-
tion, and whose fortunes, therefore, might have risen and fallen with those of the
corporation itself, you have no relationship with the target of the investigation
other than as attorney. Therefore, unlike Fayer, you will not obtain any per-
sonal benefit from the witness's assertion of the privilege. The problem with this
theory, however, is that, in the Fayer court's view, a lawyer's motive does not
have to be self-interested to be "corrupt."
The Second Circuit's definition of "corrupt" intent might assist you in your
decision. In Fayer the court stated: "It would have to be found that protection
of [Fayer's clients] itself was "corrupt," that is, Fayer was acting with knowl-
edge of crimes committed, as opposed to giving innocent counsel."192 In your
own situation, as you perceive it, your motives may be "innocent" for two rea-
sons. First, unless Scrooge confessed to you, 93 you might not have actual
knowledge 94 that Scrooge committed a crime.9 5 Moreover, the person whom
you are advising is not just a third party; Cratchit is your client's employee.
You and your client, therefore, could claim to have Cratchit's interests at
heart. 96
face of the language remaining in the statute... threatening a witness is covered"), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1018 (1989); Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 990-97 (applying § 1503 in obstruction of justice and witness
tampering context).
92. Fayer, 523 F.2d at 664.
93. According to Professor Kenneth Mann, some white-collar defense lawyers will refrain from
asking their clients whether they committed the crime under investigation. See K. MANN, supra
note 14, at 103-11.
94. For a recent decision of the Second Circuit explaining what it means for a lawyer to have
"knowledge" of someone else's criminal activity, see Doe v. Grievance Committee, 847 F.2d 57, 62
(2d Cir. 1988). For commentary critical of that decision, see Green, supra note 36.
95. The Second Circuit's interpretation of "corrupt" intent may be unduly narrow. To find
"corrupt" intent on the part of an attorney, Fayer requires a finding "that [the attorney] was acting
with knowledge of crimes committed, as opposed to giving innocent counsel." Fayer, 523 F.2d at
664. Under this interpretation, a lawyer who advises a witness to assert the fifth amendment privi-
lege does not have "corrupt" intent if she knows only that her client is suspected of a crime, but does
not know that her client is actually guilty. The lawyer's intent is innocent for purposes of the ob-
struction statute even if the lawyer's true motive is not to advance the witness's interests, but solely
to protect her own client by inducing the witness to withhold testimony that inculpates her client.
This interpretation encourages lawyers to avoid learning the full scope of their clients' past behavior.
Cf. K. MANN, supra note 14, at 104-11 (describing how and why white-collar defense lawyers some-
times avoid learning information from their clients).
The First Circuit appears to have adopted a broader interpretation of "corrupt" intent for pur-
poses of the obstruction statute. See Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 991-95. Within its definition of "corrupt
motive," the Cintolo court appears to have included an intent "to hinder the due administration of
justice" by influencing a witness to withhold truthful testimony. Id. at 991-92. If the lawyer's advice
is not designed to enable the witness "to invoke legitimate rights for his own benefit," id. at 993
(emphasis added), but is intended for the benefit of a third party, then the lawyer's motive would be
deemed corrupt.
96. This, presumably, is the basis for the distinction in Rule 3.4(f) of the Model Rules, which
permits a lawyer to give legal advice to a client's employee or relative, although not to other third
parties. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Under Fayer, however, a lawyer's desire, in part,
to promote the witness's interests, would not negate the element of "corrupt" intent. If the lawyer's
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You also might decide to limit your advice in a manner that arguably dis-
tinguishes your own proposed conduct from that of Fayer. At Fayer's meeting
with the potential government witness, he and his clients placed substantial pres-
sure on the witness to assert the privilege.9 7 In contrast, you might simply re-
mind Cratchit of what he probably knows already, namely, that he has a
constitutional right not to incriminate himself. To be sure, a witness might rea-
sonably infer from this reminder that you believe he ought to avail himself of the
fifth amendment privilege. This is true even if you sprinkle your advice with
disclaimers such as, "I'm not telling you what to do," or "you can testify or not
testify, it's up to you." Why else, a witness might ponder, would you have men-
tioned the fifth amendment privilege in the first place, if you did not want him to
assert it? Nevertheless, it could be argued that this advice is permissible, be-
cause you did not actually "persuade" Cratchit to assert the privilege or intend
to "cause or induce" him not to testify. You simply meant to enable him to
make an informed choice among legally available options.
For these reasons, notwithstanding the Fayer decision, you could reason-
ably conclude that the federal obstruction-of-justice statutes do not make it a
crime to advance your client Scrooge's interests by advising his employee,
Cratchit, of his fifth amendment right to remain silent. This conclusion, how-
ever, is no more than a prediction of how a later court in your jurisdiction would
apply the federal criminal law to your conduct. 98 Having made this prediction,
you would still have to acknowledge the significant, and sobering, possibility
that a federal prosecutor would consider your conduct illegal and that the fed-
eral courts would agree.
III. ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION AND THE AMBIGUOUS BOUNDS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW
The first part of this Article described a scenario in which you, as a criminal
defense lawyer, are faced with the question whether, to promote your client's
interests, you may properly advise a potential witness to assert the fifth amend-
ment privilege. It would be fair for you to conclude that neither the ethical
codes nor the obstruction-of-justice provisions of the criminal law forbid giving
this advice. At the same time, however, you would have to acknowledge some
possibility that the criminal laws would be interpreted expansively to reach the
proposed conduct.
This situation is far from unique. There are many instances, besides en-
counters with the opposing party's witnesses, when an advocate who fully in-
tends to act lawfully risks engaging in obstruction of justice because of the
silence or ambiguity of the ethical codes. For example, because the Code does
not specifically establish when it is wrong for a lawyer to counsel a client to
motive was mixed, and also included a desire to shield his own client's criminal activity, then the
lawyer's intent would still be deemed "corrupt." Fayer, 523 F.2d at 663-64.
97. See supra note 79.
98. Cf J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 9-12 (1950) (observing that the only way one can deter-
mine his "legal rights" is to "see what a [particular] court will do about [them]").
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destroy records that may be of evidentiary significance in a case, 99 the propriety
of this conduct is largely determined by the criminal law. 10° The Code also
leaves it largely to the criminal law to determine when a lawyer must take the
initiative to disclose evidence of a crime that he has in his possession. 10 1 The
Code fails to impose any significant limit on a lawyer's conduct in preparing his
own witnesses for trial,102 with the result that the propriety of a lawyer's con-
duct must be defined primarily by criminal laws dealing with subornation of
perjury.1 3 Similarly, the most significant limits on the advice a lawyer may give
a client are established, not by the ethical codes, 104 but by the laws that make it
a crime to aid and abet unlawful conduct.105
The obstruction-of-justice provisions are not the only criminal laws with
which advocates contend. Additionally, lawyers must consider whether the fail-
ure to disclose facts of consequence to a court or to an individual other than the
client will be construed as a criminal fraud, even where the ethical codes do not
clearly require disclosure. In many jurisdictions, a lawyer's ethical duty to dis-
close a client's fraud on a court or on another person, or to disclose a third
party's fraud on a court, arises only in the extraordinarily rare event that the
lawyer has "knowledge" of the fraud and that the source of the knowledge is
neither privileged nor confidential. 10 6 A lawyer runs the risk that criminal fraud
provisions will be read more broadly, to proscribe material omissions even where
the ethical rules require no disclosure. 107
99. See generally J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUN, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 250-66
(1989) (discussing application of ethical codes to the destruction of records).
100. See generally id. at 169-99 (discussing the application of criminal law to the destruction of
records).
101. See Lefstein, Incriminating Physical Evidence, the Defense Attorney'€ Dilemma, and the
Need for Rules, 64 N.C.L. REV. 897, 918-21 (1986).
102. See Appelgate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REv. 277, 279-80, 302-04, 328-34 (1989).
The most substantial limit is contained in DR 7-102(A)(6), which prohibits a lawyer from
"[p]articipat[ing] in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the
evidence is false." MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A)(6).
103. See K. MANN, supra note 14, at 16-18; R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS
205-06 n.l (1988) ("Experienced lawyers advise that one 'get to the witness first.' This is sound
advice, whether or not counsel has an improper motive in mind, because a witness can be subtly
recruited to the client's position or point of view before opposing counsel makes his or her rounds.");
see also In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 171 (1880) (stating that an attorney's "duty is to extract the
facts from the witness, not pour them into him"); H. DRINKER, supra note 23, at 86 ("Just where is
the line between developing all the facts known to the witness and indirectly coaching him by re-
peated statements of facts and conclusions of fact which counsel desires to establish, is, of course, a
question of good faith.").
104. See, eg., MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A)(7) (lawyer may not "[c]ounsel or assist
his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent").
105. See generally Hazard, How Far May A Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669, 681-82 (1981) (discussing guidance provided by criminal law
in defining when an attorney wrongfully counsels or assists a client in acting illegally).
106. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(B); see generally Brazil, Unanticipated Client
Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601
(1979) (discussing the lawyer's ethical duty when a client commits perjury); Callan & Davis, Profes-
sional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary
System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976) (discussing the lawyer's ethical duty to reveal client mis-
conduct); Green, supra note 36 (discussing the lawyer's ethical duty to reveal fraudulent conduct by
nonclients). The lawyer sometimes has a greater duty of disclosure where the fraud is ongoing.
107. One criminal prosecution that ilustrated this risk was brought in 1988 against a prominent
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Likewise, lawyers must be concerned that when they participate aggres-
sively in negotiations, threats about which the ethical rules are silent may be
proscribed by the criminal law of extortion. Other than forbidding the making
of false statements of law or fact,10 8 the ethical codes scarcely speak to the issue
of what is proper in negotiations. The only type of threat that is forbidden ex-
plicitly by the Model Code is a threat to expose someone's criminal conduct
made "solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter."10 9 With respect to other
types of threats that lawyers make in the course of negotiations, the lawyers'
codes leave it to the criminal law to make distinctions between what is and what
is not proper.
A leading authority, Professor Charles W. Wolfram, has pointed out that
the Model Code's silence results in substantial uncertainty about what types of
threats an attorney properly may make in the course of negotiating on behalf of
a client. 110 On the one hand, it clearly is permissible to threaten to bring a
legitimate lawsuit if a debt is not paid; on the other hand, it clearly is improper
to threaten to take action that would not be lawful, such as to "break a debtor's
thumbs in the absence of prompt payment." 1 1' In between these extremes, how-
ever, a substantial area of uncertainty creates "a potential quagmire for overly
aggressive negotiators." 112 For example, it is unclear whether a plaintiff's law-
yer may threaten that, unless the case is settled on favorable terms, she will
reveal embarrassing information to the defendant's competitor or disclose to
other plaintiffs information that may be useful to them. 113
Manhattan attorney who had represented a plaintiff in a wrongful death action. The attorney, who
ultimately was acquitted, was accused of committing a "deceit" on the court during the course of the
representation because of his failure to disclose that one of the plaintiff's witnesses had lied on cross-
examination. See Friedman Acquitted in Pedury Case, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1988, at I, col. 3.
108. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-102(A)(5); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 4.1(a).
On ethical issues in negotiations, see H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR
372-419 (1977); Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (1989); Rubin,
A Causerie on Lawyers'Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975).
109. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-105(A) provides: "A lawyer shall not present, partici-
pate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil
matter." The attorneys' codes of at least two states expand this rule to prohibit threats to present
"administrative or disciplinary" charges as well as criminal charges. See Calif. R. 5-100; Me. Bar
Rule 3.6(d); see generally C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 716-19 (1986) (discussing the
propriety of threats by lawyers).
In contrast, the Model Rules do not contain even this prohibition. See infra note.133.
110. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 109, at 715.
111. Id. at 714-15.
112. Id. at 714. There is ample case law upholding criminal convictions of individuals who, for
pecuniary gain, threatened to take action that would be entirely legal. See, eg., Moore v. Newell,
401 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (representative of charity properly convicted of violating
state extortion statute by picketing business establishment of merchant who declined to contribute to
charity), aff'd, 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1977); Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261 (Fla.) (lawyer
properly convicted of felonious extortion for threatening to give statements to the press), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 874 (1980). How far the law should extend as a general matter has been the subject of
substantial scholarly debate. See, e.g., Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 670 (1984) (setting forth a theory of blackmail explaining the illegality of combining other-
wise legal ends and means). The line between proper and improper threats is no more clear insofar
as the conduct of lawyers in particular is concerned. See Livermore, Lawyer Extortion, 20 ARIZ. L.
REv. 403, 406 (1978).
113. The well-known case of State v. Harrington, 128 Vt. 242, 260 A.2d 692 (1969), illustrates
the risk that an attorney may be charged with the crime of extortion for having made threats in
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Whenever a lawyer encounters a situation such as one of these in which the
bounds of zealous representation are set by the criminal law, he faces a series of
questions about the scope of his ethical duty. For example, as the lawyer for
Scrooge, trying to decide whether to advise Cratchit to "take the fifth," you
would have to ask: Does the duty of "zealous representation" require me to
engage in the proposed conduct that I believe to be lawful, but which a court
may later find to be unlawful? Does the duty to remain "within the bounds of
the law" require me to refrain from, this conduct which may be unlawful,
although I believe it not to be so? Does the ethical code give me discretion
whether or not to engage in this borderline conduct and, if so, how should I
exercise that discretion? These questions arise because the ethical codes do not
explicitly proscribe conduct that may run afoul of a provision of the criminal
law whose scope is uncertain. An attorney, therefore, must decide whether to
take the risk that conduct which he believes to be lawful will later be found to be
unlawful-with all the adverse consequences that flow from such a finding.
Although it is not a rare occurrence for the bounds of zealous representa-
tion to be set by ambiguous criminal provisions, and although the questions that
an attorney faces in this situation are created largely by the ethical codes, the
ethical codes provide little guidance about how to deal with the ambiguity of the
criminal laws. The failure of the ethical codes to address this problem is espe-
cially surprising given the codes' recognition that lawyers frequently must deal
with legal ambiguity. For example, one Ethical Consideration of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes:
The bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascer-
tain. The language of legislative enactments and judicial opinions may
be uncertain as applied to varying factual situations. The limits and
specific meaning of apparently relevant law may be made doubtful by
changing or developing constitutional interpretations, inadequately ex-
pressed statutes or judicial opinions, and changing public and judicial
attitudes. Certainty of law ranges from well-settled rules through ar-
eas of conflicting authority to areas without precedent. 114
settlement negotiations that are not proscribed by the attorneys' codes. Harrington represented a
woman seeking to divorce her husband on the grounds of adultery. He arranged for a woman to
seduce the client's husband and for photographs to be taken of their tryst. Afterwards, Harrington
wrote the husband a letter offering to settle the case. The letter stated that, in exchange for
$175,000, the client would give up any claim on her husband's other property. In addition, all
embarrassing recordings and photographs would be returned. And, finally, the client would not
divulge any embarrassing information about her husband, including information that might be of
interest to the Internal Revenue Service, the Customs Service, or other government agencies. Id. at
244-49, 260 A.2d at 693-96.
Based on the letter, Harrington was tried and convicted of attempted extortion. In upholding
his conviction, the Vermont Supreme Court found that it was within the province of the jury to read
the contents of Harrington's letter as "veiled threats" to expose the husband to income tax liability,
and found that any attempt to extort money by threatening to expose someone's incriminating con-
duct is extortionate. Id. at 253-54, 260 A.2d at 699.
114. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-2; see also MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, Rule 3.1 com-
ment, which provides the following:
The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's
cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substan-
tive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not
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The Ethical Considerations go on to address how a lawyer should deal with
legal ambiguity in two contexts: when he is called on as an advocate to justify
past conduct of a client that may have been unlawful, and when he is called on
as an advisor to give advice to a client about the client's proposed future
conduct:
Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer
may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer
may serve simultaneously as both advocate and adviser, but the two
roles are essentially different. In asserting a position on behalf of his
client, an advocate for the most part deals with past conduct and must
take the facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser
primarily assists his client in determining the course of future conduct
and relationships. While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve
in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law. In serving a
client as adviser, a lawyer in appropriate circumstances should give his
professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts
would likely be as to the applicable law. 115
Although these Ethical Considerations are designed to constitute "princi-
ples upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance,"' 16 they provide no guidance
to a lawyer who is trying to decide whether to engage in conduct that might
possibly turn out to be criminal. In some senses, a lawyer in this situation is an
"adviser" to himself. He must predict whether his proposed conduct is lawful.
He has no duty to resolve all doubts in favor of his client; that duty applies when
a lawyer is advancing questionable legal justifications for a client's past con-
duct,1 1 7 but not when a lawyer is considering whether to undertake future con-
duct himself.118 Instead, the lawyer must make a disinterested assessment of the
always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy,
account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.
115. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-3.
116. Id. Preliminary Statement.
117. See, eg., State Bar v. Corace, 390 Mich. 419, 434, 213 N.W.2d 124, 132 (1973) (the court
stated:
There are a larger number of gray areas in the law. When a question is doubtful, the
lawyer's obligation to his client [when advancing claims of defenses] permits him to assert
the view of the law most favorable to his client's position .... [Ojur adversary system
'intends, and expects, lawyers to probe the outer bounds of the law, ever searching for a
more efficacious remedy or a more successful defense.).
118. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has described the inapplicability of this duty in the follow-
ing manner:
Appellant directs our attention to the lawyer's duty to represent his client zealously
within the bounds of the law, as justifying his action. In his brief he cites the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, EC 7-2 wherein this sentence appears: "The bounds
of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain." Appellant says, in substance, that
in this case he was determined to represent his client as zealously as possible and while his
actions may have been marginal he was justified in resolving the doubt in favor of the
advantage to his client. We are cited to a single sentence in EC 7-3 to that effect: "While
serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor to his client doubts as to the bounds of
the law."
Neither EC 7-2 nor EC 7-3 are concerned with the type of ethical conduct involved in
this case. Those sections deal with questions involved in the advocacy of principles of law
to wit: the line between urging frivolous interpretations of statutes, constitutional law and
judicial opinions versus responsible, though perhaps unique interpretations.
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lawfulness of his own proposed conduct, just as he would if he were advising a
client about the lawfulness of the client's future conduct.
If a lawyer concludes that proposed conduct that might advance a client's
interests probably is not a crime, but that there is a risk that an ambiguous
criminal law will be interpreted to the contrary, does the requirement of zealous
advocacy require her to go up to the line of criminality, as she perceives it?119
Some high-minded lawyers may view it as improper to engage in conduct of
"doubtful legality" even if the lawyer reasonably predicts that a court ultimately
would resolve the doubts in favor of the legality of the conduct. 120 A cautious
approach is the one most consistent with "the obligation of lawyers to maintain
the highest standards of ethical conduct," 121 and, thus, the one that best pro-
motes the bar's interest in preserving public confidence in and respect for the
legal profession.
122
On the other side, however, many lawyers, including criminal defense law-
yers in particular, espouse the view that an attorney has an ethical obligation to
engage in borderline conduct when she believes that the proposed conduct ulti-
mately is not unlawful and that it will benefit the client. 123 DR 7-101 of the
Model Code supports this view, providing that "[a] lawyer shall not intention-
ally... [flail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably avail-
able means,"' 124 except that he may "[r]efuse to... participate in conduct that
he believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an argument
that the conduct is legal."' 125 The implication is that a lawyer must seek his
client's objectives through means that he believes to be legal, even if there is
some support for an argument that the conduct is unlawful.
The view that makes the most sense, however, is that while lawyers may at
their own peril approach the line of criminality, 126 they have no obligation to do
so, particularly when the line is drawn unclearly. 127 An absolute duty to go up
Wright v. Roberts, 573 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Tenn. 1978).
119. See, eg., Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 54, 312 N.W.2d 585, 606 (1981) ("'Zealous
representation' contemplates that the lawyer will go to the limits for his client.").
120. Cf. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161
(1958) ("The reasons that justify and even require partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not
grant any license to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a line of conduct that is ... of
doubtful legality.").
121. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, Preamble.
122. See id. ("[I]n the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members
of his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for
the highest possible degree of ethical conduct.").
123. See K. MANN, supra note 14, at 17-18 ("Providing the best available defense to a client-in
a criminal case as well as a civil case-requires an acute sense of how to approach as close as possible
to the margin of legitimate action, without going over it."); see also Carberry, supra note 21, at 301
("[W]hile certain conduct appears ethically questionable and raises difficult issues in the abstract,
there is really no gray area of ethical conduct for many practitioners. The only conduct considered
prohibited is that which is expressly forbidden; everything else is justified as zealous advocacy.").
124. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-l01(A)(l).
125. Id. DR 7-101(B)(2).
126. Cf. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930) ("T]he very meaning of a
line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.").
127. This is probably the view that most lawyers, including most defense lawyers, actually hold.
See, eg., Tigar, One Man's Freedom, One Man's Faith, 16 LITIGATION, No. 3, 63 (1990) (" 'Just
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to the line of an ambiguous criminal law poses unjustifiable risks to lawyers. It
rarely would be a defense to criminal charges that the lawyer mistakenly be-
lieved his conduct was lawful.1 28 Nor would the existence of the ethical duty
itself provide a defense, because judges, in adopting ethical rules, have no au-
thority to preempt provisions of the criminal law. 129 It would be anomalous to
suppose that the ethical codes require lawyers to risk their liberty and liveli-
hoods while representing a client. As a general rule, the ethical codes give law-
yers discretion to protect themselves in the course of helping their clients. 130
Moreover, such a requirement would undermine the bar's interest in ensuring
that lawyers obey the criminal law. A lawyer who customarily engages in con-
duct of "doubtful legality" faces a substantial likelihood that, sooner or later, he
will find himself on the wrong side of the line.' 31 For these reasons, it is fair to
conclude that conduct that might further a client's objectives is not "reasonably
available" within the meaning of DR 7-101 when there is a significant possibility
that the conduct might be deemed illegal by a court.
IV. THE NEED FOR EXPLICIT ETHICAL LIMITS ON ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
By permitting ambiguous criminal laws to set the bounds of zealous advo-
remember, when times are tough and it looks like someone's going to jail, make sure it's your cli-
ent.' ") (quoting Edward Bennett Williams).
128. As a general rule, a mistake of law is not a defense unless knowledge of the law is an
element of the criminal offense. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1(a) (2d ed.
1986). In contrast, in disciplinary proceedings, a lawyer generally will not be sanctioned for violat-
ing an ambiguous disciplinary provision that he reasonably believed did not apply to his conduct.
See eg., In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 635-36, 449 A.2d 483, 500 (1982) (The court declined to find
attorney in violation of any ethical rule in part because, in a case involving an ethical precept rather
than a criminal law, the decision itself is a sufficient explanation of the ethical responsibility of
attorneys.).
129. The famous "buried bodies" case provides a rare example of a case in which the reach of a
criminal law was found to be circumscribed by a lawyer's ethical duty, in this instance, the duty to
preserve client confidences. See People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, aff'd, 50
A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867
(1976). For commentary on this case, see Chamberlain, Legal Ethics: Confidentiality and the Case
of Robert Garrow's Lawyers, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1975); Freedman, Where the Bodies Are
Buried: The Adversary System and the Obligation of Confidentiality, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 979 (1974).
130. For example, the ethical codes always have provided that a lawyer may divulge client confi-
dences when necessary to collect a fee or to defend against accusations of wrongful conduct. MODEL
CODE, supra note 1, DR 4-101(C)(4); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(2). Similarly, the
codes allow a lawyer to withdraw from the representation of a client when the client stops paying the
lawyer's fee. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-110(C)(1)(f); MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule
1.16(b)(4).
131. Suppose, for example, that a lawyer engages in four different acts, each of which, under
different criminal laws, is of questionable legality. Suppose, further, that in the lawyer's view,
although each act would most likely be found lawful, there is a 20% chance that it would be found
unlawful by a court. In such a case, based on the lawyer's own predictions, there would be almost a
60% likelihood that at least one of the acts would be found to be unlawful.
Moreover, it might reasonably be expected that the lawyer's predictions will understate the
likelihood that his own future behavior will be found unlawful, since, in making that assessment, he
will be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the desire to further the client's interests. Cf
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (attorney may be reluctant to convey to his client a
disinterested assessment of the likelihood that the lawyer will have a conflict of interest). This prob-
lem can be addressed by obtaining the assessment of a lawyer who is not involved in the case. Cf.
United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 890 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant should be allowed to consult
with independent counsel about the likelihood that retained counsel will have a conflict of interest).
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cacy, the ethical rules induce lawyers to engage in borderline, if not criminal,
conduct. The duty of zealous advocacy exerts pressure on lawyers to take risks
on behalf of clients that they ordinarily might not take on behalf of them-
selves. 132 This pressure is particularly palpable in areas of practice such as crim-
inal defense work. A criminal defense attorney will often find that his client's
interests would be well served by conduct that, though not specifically pro-
scribed by the ethical codes, approaches the gray line drawn by ambiguous crim-
inal laws. For this lawyer, the apparent willingness to defend a client
aggressively is often necessary to attract clients, especially if the lawyer seeks to
be retained by white-collar clients who have the financial resources and expertise
to shop around for able counsel. To a sophisticated person who is or may be
facing criminal charges, aggressiveness in defense is likely to be considered an
important qualification for a lawyer. A lawyer will not receive many clients if he
develops a reputation for deliberately declining to take steps that he believes to
be lawful and that would advance his clients' interests. Therefore, defense law-
yers may feel compelled to skirt the edge of legality as a way of attracting
clients.
When attorneys feel compelled to engage in borderline conduct, a problem
is created not only for those attorneys, but for the organized bar as well. That
attorneys engage in borderline conduct on a regular basis, and can point to the
ethical codes as a justification for doing so, invariably breeds public disrespect
for the legal profession. This phenomenon is compounded by the inevitability
that, from time to time, attorneys who are trying to act lawfully will predict
erroneously the direction of the criminal law and engage in conduct that is in
fact criminal.
Why do the ethical codes engender these problems? In a limited number of
situations, the drafters of the ethical codes may have believed that they were
justified in not proscribing particular conduct that approaches the line of crimi-
nality. For example, in some situations, the silence of the Model Code or the
Model Rules may have reflected the drafters' judgment that the conduct in ques-
tion is in fact improper, but that it would be duplicative to restate clear criminal
provisions in the ethical codes. This judgment apparently prompted the drafters"
of the Model Rules not to include a counterpart to DR 7-105(A) of the Model
Code, which deems it improper to "present, participate in presenting, or
threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil
matter." 133
132. Ordinarily, an individual has no justification that society recognizes as acceptable for ap-
proaching the line of criminality. It is therefore fair "to require that one who deliberately goes
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line."
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). In contrast, a lawyer has a duty,
recognized as important by society, to provide zealous representation to his clients. The existence of
this duty may be thought to justify a lawyer, in defense of a client, to come closer to the area of
proscribed conduct than he might ordinarily do when simply acting on his own behalf.
133. The conduct proscribed by this disciplinary rule is also a crime. It would constitute extor-
tion or, in some jurisdictions, the ancient crime of "compounding a crime." See eg., N.Y. PENAL
L. § 215.45 (1988) ("A person is guilty of compounding a crime when: (a) He solicits, accepts or
agrees to accept any benefit upon an agreement or understanding that he will refrain from initiating
a prosecution for a crime"); In re Abrahams, 158 A.D. 595, 596-97, 143 N.Y.S. 927, 929-30 (1st
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In other instances, the drafters of the ethical codes may have decided that,
wherever the criminal law may draw lines and no matter how fuzzy those lines
may be, the codes should not impose any further restrictions on what a lawyer
may do on behalf of a client. For example, as noted earlier, the Model Code's
only guidance regarding the propriety of threats made in negotiations is in for-
bidding a threat to expose someone's criminal conduct that is made "solely to
obtain an advantage in a civil matter." 134 Despite uncertainties about the scope
of the law of extortion, the drafters of the ethical codes deliberately may have
opted to let the criminal law set the bounds of proper conduct in negotiations. If
the ethical codes imposed special restrictions on lawyers involved in negotia-
tions, the value of lawyers would diminish relative to self-representation or the
representation of nonlawyers. Deferral to the qriminal code, therefore, encour-
ages clients to retain attorneys to render a service that clients might otherwise
perform themselves or retain nonlawyers to perform. 135 Because virtually the
only limits imposed on a lawyer in business negotiations are those under which
nonlawyers would similarly labor, the lawyer's services are much more attrac-
tive. The lawyer can do everything that anyone else could do on behalf of a
client, and presumably she will do it more skillfully.
In still other situations, the limits imposed by the ethical codes may be less
restrictive than those imposed by the criminal law because many in the organ-
ized bar do not believe that the additional restraints are appropriate. This belief
may explain the manner in which the ethical rules deal with the disclosure of
fraudulent conduct. The disclosure provisions of the ethical codes are the prod-
uct of considerable debate and deliberation, and apparently reflect a consensus
about when disclosure should and should not be required of lawyers. Presuma-
bly, the drafters believed that, because of concerns for preserving client confi-
dences and for protecting client interests in general, lawyers should have only a
limited duty under the ethical codes to disclose frauds by clients and third par-
ties. Lawyers simply must be alert to the possibility that, in their jurisdiction,
courts could read the criminal fraud provisions to impose an obligation of dis-
closure that exceeds the ethical codes.
In most instances, however, it is extremely doubtful that the drafters of the
ethical codes had any credible justification for relying on ambiguous criminal
provisions. Of course, the drafters' reasons for failing to address clearly the pro-
priety of any particular type of professional conduct is usually just a matter of
speculation, because the drafting process was essentially private and unre-
corded. 13 6 But it is reasonable to conclude that, for the most part, the ABA
drafters either did not consider at all the questions that are relegated to the
Dept. 1913). Apparently, the drafters of the Model Rules believed that a rule on this subject would
be superfluous, since threats to present criminal charges already were forbidden by the criminal law
of extortion, and a lawyer who made extortionate threats could be disciplined for violating that law.
See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 109, at 718.
134. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 7-105(A); see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
135. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 109, at 714.
136. For a discussion of the problems of interpretation created by the absence of a record of the
drafters' deliberations, see Green, supra note 36, at 539-42.
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criminal law or declined to resolve those questions clearly and explicitly for rea-
sons that had nothing to do with their beliefs concerning the propriety of the
particular conduct.
The ethical codes' failure to deal explicitly with the question raised at the
outset of this Article-namely, whether it is proper to advise a witness to "take
the fifth"-illustrates the drafters' unjustified reliance on the criminal law. They
could not have concluded, for example, that the criminal law resolves this ques-
tion so clearly as to eliminate the need to address it in the ethical codes. On the
contrary, as discussed above, the scope of the law against obstruction of justice is
extremely unclear. 137 Because the drafters could not know precisely how the
obstruction-of-justice provision applied to lawyers, they could not have con-
cluded reasonably that the criminal law was a good one, and that no further
restrictions were warranted. Nor could they have concluded that the criminal
law provides enough guidance to make an ethical rule on the subject
unnecessary.
It is equally implausible that the drafters wanted to limit the restrictions
imposed on criminal defense attorneys to encourage clients to retain attorneys.
This rationale makes no sense when applied in the area of advocacy, as distin-
guished from business negotiations. While clients may consider themselves and
their nonlawyer agents well qualified to negotiate many commercial matters
without assistance, and so might refrain from employing a lawyer who could not
negotiate as vigorously as the client could on his own,138 norlawyer agents are
not permitted to represent clients in litigation, and few clients would feel compe-
tent representing themselves. Therefore, clients retain attorneys to represent
them in litigation-and particularly in criminal litigation-without regard to the
ethical restraints under which attorneys labor.
Nor can it be concluded that the failure to address this question explicitly
reflected the drafters' affirmative conclusion that, unless the conduct is otherwise
proscribed by the criminal law, lawyers should be permitted to advise witnesses
to assert the fifth amendment privilege. The wisdom of allowing lawyers to give
this advice is, in the very least, debatable. It is hard to imagine that the drafters
of the ethical codes deliberately would have endorsed this questionable con-
duct-and thereby placed lawyers at risk of violating the criminal law-without
first making it clear that they were doing so and inviting comment. Nothing in
the professional literature indicates that prior to the adoption of the ethical
codes there was any serious discussion of this subject either among the drafters
themselves or within the legal profession generally. 139
137. See supra notes 65-98 and accompanying text; see also Uviller, supra note 13, at 1883 ("The
statutory definition of the crime of obstruction of justice is a model of imprecision.").
138. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 109, at 714.
139. Similarly, the failure to establish additional bounds around zealous representation cannot
be ascribed purely to a philosophical view that there should be no ethical restraints on advocates.
Although the view might have been taken that the appropriate role of an advocate is to do on behalf
of the client precisely what the client would do for himself if he were trained in the law, it is clear
that the drafters of the Code did not take this laissezfaire approach, but, at least in some circum-
stances, imposed restraints on advocates that would not apply to laymen. To take just two examples:
A lawyer is forbidden to communicate directly with an opposing party who has retained counsel, but
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If the drafters of the ethical codes had any reason, other than inattention,
for failing to deal with this question in the ethical codes, their reason undoubt-
edly did not reflect a considered view of whether or not it is proper to advise a
witness to assert the constitutional privilege. The drafters of the ethical codes
may have believed that this and similar questions involving the propriety of con-
duct in the course of criminal advocacy were not important enough to address in
a code of general applicability to lawyers. 14° Or, while recognizing the impor-
tance of these issues, the drafters may have decided not to address them to save
themselves time, or for reasons of political expedience. 14 1 The most likely expla-
nation, however, is probably the cynical one that Professor Geoffrey Hazard
suggested: The drafters largely ignored questionable, secretive acts of criminal
defense lawyers simply to deny the reality that lawyers regularly engage in such
conduct. 142
The profession should not continue to ignore borderline professional con-
duct. As a general rule, the ethical codes should proscribe clearly and explicitly
professional conduct that comes close to the line drawn by ambiguous criminal
laws. This approach should be taken for at least two reasons. The first, and
more pragmatic, reason is that by proscribing conduct that approaches the line
of criminality, the ethical codes would clarify the bounds of zealous advocacy in
a manner that prevents lawyers from unintentionally engaging in criminal con-
duct. Lawyers would not have to rely on a potentially erroneous prediction
about the scope of the criminal law in order to vigorously represent their clients.
The second reason is that this approach would enable the moral judgments
of the organized bar to conform, where appropriate, with the moral judgments
of society in general. The criminal law generally reflects a societal expression
that particular conduct is not only unethical, but so wrongful that it should be
punished. When professional conduct approaches the line of criminality, the
public likely would view it as unethical, whether or not it should be punished.
Absent a compelling reason for viewing the conduct differently, the organized
bar ought to rely on the popular conception and condemn the particular conduct
by adopting an ethical rule that proscribes it.
One example of an ethical question that should be resolved in light of this
must communicate through the opposing counsel. See MODEL CODE, supra note I, DR 7-
104(A)(1). A lawyer is also restrained in what he may say to the press about a pending case. See id.
DR 7-107. A layman who represented himself would not labor under these restrictions.
140. For example, the drafters may have believed that the propriety of advising witnesses about
the fifth amendment privilege is an issue that does not often arise and that relates to only a small
group of lawyers, namely, defense attorneys. A similar expression of the perceived unimportance of
the issue apparently was reflected in the decision of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics to
deal with this issue informally in ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 575 (1962),
rather than in a formal opinion. See STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 6 (1967) ("Informal Opin-
ions are responses to questions that are comparatively narrow in scope and arise infrequently.").
141. The Code of Professional Responsibility was criticized for dealing almost exclusively with
the issues that were the concern of its predecessor Canons of Professional Ethics and failing to deal
with many additional problems of contemporary law practice. The more recent Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, although intended to redress that shortcoming, have received much the same
criticism. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 109, at 59-60.
142. Hazard, supra note 21, at 1534.
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approach is the one with which this Article began: the question whether it is
proper to advise someone other than a client to assert the fifth amendment privi-
lege. In the absence of concerns about the legality of this conduct, attorneys
reasonably might be permitted to engage in it. This is true largely because the
criminal law and the ethical codes approach this question from vastly different
perspectives.
From the perspective of the criminal law, there is little reason to distinguish
a lawyer from anyone else who desires to block the prosecution's access to testi-
mony. The overarching purpose of the obstruction-of-justice provisions of the
criminal law is to preserve evidence and truthful testimony for the prosecution's
use in judicial proceedings. The preservation of truthful testimony is under-
mined when a lawyer acts with the design of convincing a witness not to testify,
even when he gives legally accurate advice. In contrast, the attorneys' codes
reflect a view of proper attorney conduct that revolves primarily around the
interests of individual clients, rather than the interests of the administration of
justice. The advocate's overarching function is the protection of the client. One
means of serving that function is to control information that otherwise might be
used to the client's detriment by the opposing party. Thus, the very aim that the
obstruction-of-justice statute deems "corrupt"-namely, the protection of a
guilty person from having his crimes discovered-is often the principal aim of a
defense attorney whose client is under investigation. From an attorney's per-
spective, there is no reason why this aim should not be furthered by advising an
unrepresented witness to assert a constitutionally available privilege.
Moreover, from the advocate's viewpoint, advising a witness to assert the
fifth amendment privilege furthers the legitimate interests not just of the attor-
ney's client, but of the witness as well. As the Illinois court noted in People v.
Wolf, 143 the availability of the fifth amendment privilege is something that an
unrepresented witness has an interest in knowing. 144 While an attorney may
suggest that the witness secure his own counsel, or may even offer to assist him
in doing so, 145 these alternatives are not always viable.1 46 When the witness
cannot secure independent representation, the only alternative to letting the wit-
ness go without the necessary advice about his rights is to permit the representa-
tive of an interested party to advise him. 147
143. 162 Ill. App. 3d 57, 514 N.E.2d 1218 (1987).
144. Id. at 61, 514 N.E.2d at 1220-21; see supra notes 40.44 and accompanying text.
145. In many cases, prudent white-collar defense attorneys avoid the need to communicate di-
rectly with their clients' employees or associates by arranging for other cooperative attorneys to
represent these individuals. See K. MANN, supra note 14, at 174-80.
146. Not all witnesses can afford counsel during the course of an investigation, and although
counsel may sometimes be appointed to represent grand jury witnesses, there is not a constitutional
right to appointed counsel at that stage. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976).
Likewise, although it is not uncommon for large corporations to retain attorneys to represent its
employees who, along with the corporation, are under investigation, see, eg., United States v. Jones,
900 F.2d 512, 515-18 (2d Cir. 1990), not all businesses reasonably can afford to do so.
147. Prosecutors would undoubtedly argue that they are the less interested, and therefore the
more appropriate party, to give advice about the fifth amendment privilege to potential witnesses.
Their advice would, however, be less extensive than that which might be provided by defense coun-
sel. While a prosecutor or his agent might advise a potential government witness about the avallabil-
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However reasonable these arguments are when viewed independently of the
criminal law, they are not sufficiently persuasive when the uncertain scope of the
obstruction-of-justice provisions is taken into account. The ethical view under-
lying these provisions-that individuals should not obstruct the government's
efforts to procure incriminating evidence and testimony from others-is worthy
of respect by the organized bar. An ethical rule forbidding defense attorneys to
advise nonclients to "take the fifth" would accord appropriate respect without
substantially impinging on the interests of clients and witnesses. At the same
time, such a rule would diminish the risk that lawyers, while attempting to re-
main within the bounds of zealous advocacy, will violate the criminal law.
This is not to say that there will never be a persuasive, countervailing justifi-
cation for allowing the criminal law to continue to set the bounds of zealous
advocacy. But reliance should be placed on the criminal law only after informed
deliberation, not as a consequence of inattention or unconcern, and only when
the justification for doing so is especially compelling. Moreover, the ethical
codes should make it clear that, when the criminal law does set the bounds of
"zealous representation," there is no ethical duty to engage in potentially crimi-
nal conduct. Attorneys should have discretion not to approach the line of the
criminal law, even if they believe that their conduct would be deemed lawful if
the question were presented to a court.
1 4 8
ity of the fifth amendment privilege, it is hard to conceive that he or his agent would actually suggest
that the witness assert the privilege.
148. The recognition of such discretion would raise an additional question: If a lawyer decides
not to engage in borderline conduct on behalf of a client, does he have a duty to apprise his client of
that, so that the client has an opportunity to seek more aggressive counsel? If the lawyer's decision
is viewed simply as a matter of tactics or strategy, the answer is probably not, at least under the
Model Code. A lawyer is instructed to "fully and promptly inform his client of material develop-
ments in the matters being handled for the client." MODEL CODE, supra note 1, EC 9-2. It is
unlikely, however, that a lawyer's decision to refrain from conduct that is close to the line of crimi-
nality would be considered a "material development" in the case.
Under the Model Rules, the answer is less clear. A lawyer must "explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."
MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.4(b). It may be argued that, when a lawyer deliberately re-
frains from taking steps that he believes to be both lawful and helpful to the client, the client has the
right to make an "informed decision" whether to seek a less cautious lawyer. But the reference in
the Model Rules to "informed decisions" probably refers to those types of decisions that are tradi-
tionally or legally entrusted to the client, such as the decision whether to settle a civil lawsuit, or, in a
criminal case, the decisions whether to plead guilty or to testify at trial.
There would be a duty to consult with the client, however, if the attorney's decision not to
engage in conduct of questionable legality is viewed, as perhaps it should be, as the product of a
conflict of interest. The conflict is between the lawyer's own penal and professional interests and the
interests of the client. The decision to refrain from borderline conduct that is believed to be legal
and that would advance the client's interests is designed as a matter of prudence to safeguard the
attorney's own interest in avoiding illegal acts. Courts have recognized in other contexts that an
attorney-for example, a criminal defense attorney who is himself under investigation-may have a
conflict between his own penal interests and those of his client. See, e.g., United States v. Cancilla,
725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1984); Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1983); cf.
United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1990) ("An actual conflict of interest exists when
an attorney engages in wrongful conduct related to the client's trial. In such a situation, the fear of
prompting a government investigation into the attorney's own wrongdoing would preclude an attor-
ney from asserting a vigorous defense in behalf of his client.") (citations omitted). Although this
conflict would not be of a magnitude to require a lawyer to withdraw from the representation, it
might require the attorney to obtain the client's informed consent before continuing in the represen-
tation. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(b); Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, DR 5-101.
[Vol. 69
ETHICAL REPRESENTATION
V. CONCLUSION
The ethical codes of the legal profession instruct attorneys to represent their
clients zealously within the bounds of law. For many attorneys, and especially
criminal defense attorneys, the bounds of "zealous representation" often are set
not by clear ethical provisions, but by ambiguous criminal laws. 'When the crim-
inal law sets the limits, attorneys seeking to serve their clients' interests zeal-
ously invariably will feel pressure to engage in conduct that approaches the line
of criminality. Because of the ambiguity of the criminal law, the risk arises that
attorneys inadvertently will cross the line and act in ways that a court could
consider to be illegal.
The ethical codes should not place attorneys in this position. As a general
matter, the ethical codes should address the aspects of professional representa-
tion that the criminal laws affect, rather than relegate to the criminal codes the
task of imposing appropriate limits on attorneys. In most instances, a restrictive
approach should be taken. By establishing clear and explicit ethical rules that
proscribe professional conduct which conceivably could be held to be illegal, the
codes would promote public respect for the profession and protect ethical attor-
neys from engaging in practices of doubtful legality. At the very least, as an
important first step, those professional practices coming close to violating ob-
struction-of-justice, fraud, and extortion laws should be acknowledged and made
the subject of informed debate and discussion by the organized bar.149
The ethical codes wrongfully place attorneys in a risky position by failing to
provide guidance about how to deal with the ambiguous limits set by the crimi-
nal law. The ethical codes currently acknowledge the legal ambiguities that con-
front attorneys. They should go further to clarify that, when the lines drawn by
the criminal laws are ambiguous, the duty of zealous representation implies no
duty to put oneself at risk.
149. See Hazard, supra note 21, at 1534.
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